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much broadened, and will enable him to join additional defendants where
in the past he had been deprived of the right through inability to secure
service on a non-resident party. 0
It may be objected that this enlarged power to secure service can be
entirely destroyed by the act of the plaintiff. It is true that if the original
suit is instituted in a county other than where the transaction took place
or the cause of action arose the right to extraterritorial service is lost.
However, the basis of the right is also lost, since you are not forcing the
third party to defend at the place where his liability-creating conduct took
place or where the right arose as a result of such conduct, and the defendant has no ground on which to claim the extraterritorial service.
V. CONCLUSION
From the preceding discussion it should be clear that the new rules
afford an opportunity to eliminate many of the evils existing under the old
procedures. Certainly the litigation on the mechanics of the device which
proved so troublesome heretofore has been largely eliminated. An exception may exist in the motion to dismiss which in practice may prove too
cumbersome and all-inclusive to be satisfactory. Possibly, also, questions
will arise over the grounds for joinder owing largely to the restricted
interpretation placed on the joinder provision of the Sci Fa Acts. As was
pointed out, the difficulty is to a great extent theoretical, since joinder has
been permitted in violation of the express terms of the Jones case where
the policy which necessitated that decision was not involved. Nevertheless
the possible limitations inherent in the rule of that case should be removed,
now that the express indemnitor can be adequately protected by the discretionary power of the trial court. This discretionary power will probably
be subjected to a great deal of criticism, largely because it is a new and
untried method radically modifying previous Pennsylvania procedure. It
should be remembered that change was necessary and that the method has
been used successfully in other jurisdictions. However, the benefit to be
derived from it and from the general increase of power vested in the trial
court will be directly proportioned to the care and effort expended on its
exercise. That it can be rendered practically valueless by perfunctory
application is well illustrated by the confusion and inconvenience permitted
to continue during the past ten years while a simple remedy existed in the
trial court's power to sever issues in complicated cases. On the manner of
application the success of the new procedure depends; only time can show
whether the remedy promised will actually materialize.
T. A. O'B.
NOTE
Oral Suretyship Contracts and the Leading Object Rule in

Pennsylvania
A creditor unable to collect from his irresponsible debtor is admittedly
in an unfortunate position, and desire to avoid this has led many a creditor
to fabricate a claim that a third person had orally promised to pay the
debt. Prior to the Statute of Frauds, the temptation was great because
the possibility of success in establishing such a claim was greatly enhanced

go. See explanatory remarks to Rule 2254. See also Rule 2131 (c) (service on a
partnership), and Rule 2157 (c) (service on an unincorporated association), which give
the same right of service.
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by the susceptibility of such an oral promise to proof contrary to fact.
Thus, the obvious purpose behind the enactment of that section of the
statute requiring a promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another to be in writing ' was to remove this temptation, and to prevent
the successful prosecution of claims of this nature. 2 Yet at the very outset it became equally obvious that a strict construction of the statute would
be as likely to effectuate a fraud by the promisor as to prevent one by the
creditor, and there has long been a tendency on the part of the courts to
narrow the effect of the statute in certain instances.3
In attempting to define the type of case in which the application of the
statute is generally denied, it is helpful to consider, from an abstract point
of view, the reasons behind the legislative discrimination between a promise to pay one's own debt and a promise to pay that of another. The most
apparent distinction between the two situations is that the former involves,
in addition to the alleged promise, an indebtedness, which is difficult to
prove contrary to fact and which of itself is indicative of a liability in the
person directly benefited. Further analysis shows that the ordinary contract requirement of consideration can be easily satisfied in the latter situation without raising any suspicion as to the liability of the supposed
promisor. For where the promise of S is allegedly given before the debt
is incurred it, as well as the promise of P, the principal debtor, is iufficiently supported by the extension of credit to P, and where the alleged
promise is to pay a pre-existing debt of P's it is supportable by any detriment to C, the creditor, such as forbearance to sue P or dismissal of suit
against him. In neither case is the nature of the consideration suggestive
of a promise by S. Thus it is logical to suppose that the legislative discrimination above-mentioned was dictated by a twofold desire: (i) to
hold an honest man who has received no apparent benefit only in accordance with his exact promise; and (2) to remove the possibility of success, on the part of the creditor with a worthless claim, in fabricating a
case against a third party, where the only thing indicative of liability in
such party as well as the only thing necessary to be established contrary to
fact is an oral promise. So the courts have reasoned that the statute
was never intended as an aid to a person, upon whom valuable benefits
have been directly conferred, in avoiding any inquiry into whether or not
he promised to pay therefor, even though payment would result in extinguishing the debt of another, and have been in general agreement in
removing this class of cases from the scope of the statute. 4 However, the
1. 29 CAR. II, c. 3, § 4 (1676).
Pennsylvania did not include this section in its original statute of frauds, and it was not until 1855 that a substantially similar act was
passed: "No action shall be brought whereby to charge . . . the defendant, upon any
special promise, to answer for the debt or default of another, unless the agreement upon
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in
writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him
authorized." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93o) tit. 33, § 3.
2. See ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (927)
§ 39.
3. See ARANT, SURETYSHIP (931) § 31, and cases cited therein. Substantially,
cases in which the statute has not been applied are merely illustrations of an evasion of
the statute. Being promises to pay the debt of another, whether or not incidental to a
broader purpose of the promisor, the instances referred to would seem to be clearly
within the wording of the statute.
The historical reluctance of equity courts to give effect to the statute of frauds
even as to its other sections should be kept in mind as a partial explanation of the
judge-made exceptions to the various sections of the statute.
4. Ibid. Such a result might be justified by drawing an analogy to the equity doctrine of partial performance in removing oral contracts for the sale of interests in land
from the statute of frauds. See WALSir, EQUITY (1930) § 77 et seq. But some states
reject this doctrine completely. Id. at 403. Perhaps the harsh results of rigid application have been lessened therein by early education.
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difficulty of phrasing any general rule to cover all the factual situations
arising has led to much confusion. 5
In their efforts to evade the statute, the courts have evolved certain
general propositions. For an alleged oral promisor to invoke the protection of the statute there must be an obligation from a third person to the
promisee to which the alleged promise can be collateral,' the promise being
allegedly made to the creditor," and to pay out of the promisor's own substance.8 The confusion arises in the effort to further narrow the application of the statute, when all of the aforementioned requirements are satisfied, by removing from its reach cases in which the alleged promisor is
apparently seeking to promote his own interests and has received a consideration more or less advantageous to him. Perhaps one of the most
common of the several tests devised to accomplish this end is that dubbed
the "main purpose" or "leading object" rule, which received its impetus
in an early Massachusetts case,' and to which the Pennsylvania courts
have given voice in the following terms:
"'... when the leading object of the promise or agreement is to
become guarantor or surety to the promisee, for the debt for which
a third party is and continues to be primarily liable, the agreement,
whether made before or after, or at the time with the promise of the
principal, is within the statute, and not binding unless evidenced by
writing. On the other hand, when the leading object of the promisor
is to subserve some interest or purpose of his own, notwithstanding
the effect is to pay or discharge the debt of another, his promise is
not within the statute." 10
From an examination of the rule as stated, certain inconsistencies appear.
When it is remembered that the purpose of the statute was to remove the
likelihood of imposing liability on an innocent person on the basis of a
promise he did not make, it is curious to note that a rule, drawn to effectuate a more equitable application of this statute, by its very declaration,
assumes in the first instance that the promise was made, and then goes
ahead to inquire into the purpose of the promisor in making it. Needless
to say, it was not the purpose of the statute to provide relief for one who
has actually promised, and whose promise is supported by the requisite
legal consideration, merely because the promise was promoted by a desire
to aid another. Again it has been seen that the class of cases to which
the statute should not be applicable is that in which the alleged promisor
has received a consideration beneficial to himself and of such a nature as
to be, of itself, indicative of a promise by the receiver. Yet the test to
be applied to determine whether or not a case can be properly included
in such classification emphasizes not the nature of the consideration involved
but rather the state of mind of the promisor in making the promise, not
the benefit actually received but the advantage sought. Such emphasis
substitutes for a palpable basis on which to infer the existence of a prom5.See 2 WILLISTON, CONRAcTs (1936) § 462, 467 et seq.
6. Lieberman v. Colahan, 267 Pa. 102, 11o Atl. 246 (192o) ; Black v. Bernheimer,
66 Pa. Super. 41 (1917) ; see ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 33 and cases cited therein.
7. See ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 32 and cases cited therein. But see Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, 524, 19 Atl. 746, 748 (1890).
8. Stoudt v. Hine, 45 Pa. 3o (1863) ; Fehlinger v. Wood, 134 Pa. 517, ig Atl. 746
(i89o) - Collins v. Herwick, io9 Pa. Super. 413, 167 AtL. 474 (I933) ; cf. Seabrook v.
Betz, 38 Pa. 333, 162 Atl. 26o (1932) ; see ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 34 and cases
cited therein.
9.Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396 (Mass. 1841).
io. Nugent v. Wolfe, III Pa. 471, 480, 4 Atl. 15, 17 (1886).
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ise a nebulosity often difficult to determine to any satisfactory degree,
and equivocal in its implication. 1 In substance, at least, the leading object
rule is based upon common sense. But its very vagueness, perhaps purposeful in the beginning to enable further evasions of the statute, has led
to conflicting results and lack of uniformity.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF RULE IN PENNSYLVANIA
The dictum of Chancellor Kent of New York in Leonard v. Vredenburgh,"12 to the effect that a promise to pay the debt of another is not

within the statute when it arises out of some new and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting parties, 13
antedated the declaration of the leading object rule by about thirty years,
and after much criticism has been generally discarded as too loose. 4 The
difficulty is that, under such doctrine, any consideration of detriment to
the creditor or promisee is sufficient to remove the promise from the protection of the statute, and yet, as has already been seen, this situation is
squarely within the evils contemplated by the statute.
The next step in formulating the rule was taken by Chief Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts in Nelson v. Boynton, 5 a leading case on the subject:
". .. cases are not considered as coming within the statute, when
the party promising has for his object a benefit which he did not before enjoy, accruing immediately to himself; but where the object of
the promise is to obtain the release of the person or property of the
debtor, or other forbearance or benefit to him, it is within the statute." :'

The emphasis is here shifted to the beneficial nature of the consideration,
yet Arnold v. Stedanan,17 one of the earliest Pennsylvania cases on the
subject, failed to distinguish the Massachusetts rule from Kent's, citing
both with approval. C had a mechanic's lien on S's land for work done
thereon for P, prior possessor, and S orally promised C that he would pay,
C agreeing to stop proceedings. On C's suit to enforce this promise the
protection of the statute was denied because the consideration was beneficial to S, because it was a new and original one arising between S and C
independently of P's debt, and because S's object was to subserve a purpose of his own. The impossibility of determining the precise ground upon
which the decision was based made obvious the need for further clarification, and, at least so far as it terminated the existence of Chancellor Kent's
doctrine in Pennsylvania, this need was supplied by the case of Maule v.
Bucknell, 8 decided two years later. Here S orally promised C, director,
stockholder and creditor of P company, that he would pay P's debts, including the one owed to C, if C would transfer to him certain stock and
resign his office, thereby enabling S to become a director and gain control.
On suit by C to enforce this promise, the court, stressing the collateral
nature of the promise and the continuance of P's original liability, held the
promise to be within the statute and hence unenforceable. The Leonard
ii. See ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 113.
12.

8 Johns.

13. Id. at 39.

29

(N. Y. 1811).

14. See Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. 143, 146 et seq. (1874) ;
supra note 5, at 1358.
15. 3 Metc. 396 (Mass. 1841).
16. Id. at 402.
17. 45 Pa. 186 (1863).
18. 50 Pa. 39 (1865).

2 WILLISTON,

op. Cit.
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case dictum was expressly disapproved 11 and the Arnold case was distinguished as coming within a recognized exception to the statute wherein
the promisor's property was liable for the debt independent of his express
promise, S undertaking to pay the debt of the property."
The court here
indicated satisfaction in observing a recent tendency to construe the statute
more strictly. 21 Yet it is probable that had the leading object rule,
which, curiously enough, was not mentioned by the court in spite of discussion in briefs of counsel, been more fully developed at this time an
opposite result would have been forthcoming. Basically, anyway, it seems
apparent that such a factual situation does not readily lend itself to proof
contrary to fact.
It remained for the leading case of Nugent v. Wolfe, 22 some twenty
years later, to introduce the rule, as previously quoted, in its modem form,
the courts in subsequent cases being content to quote the rule as stated
therein rather than attempt a different phraseology. 23 In the Nugent case,
X had obtained a judgment against P, and S persuaded C to go security
for stay of execution on this judgment, orally promising to indemnify C
for any loss he should suffer thereby. 24 C, being forced to pay, sued S
on his oral promise, and the court in denying recovery applied the rule to
bring the case within the statute, saying that the only consideration for
his promise was a detriment to C, S having no personal interest involved.
From this it seems to follow that although the declaration of the rule
stresses the object of the promisor, either the nature of the consideration
or the actual existence of a personal interest is the controlling factor in
its application. The remainder of this note will be devoted to an effort
to discover just what circumstances are stressed by the Pennsylvania courts
in their application of the rule, and whether the results reached thereby
approach any workable degree of consistency.
II. APPLICATION
(a) Personal Interest of Promisor as Ultimate Test
In very few, if any, cases has the court been disposed to remove oral
promises to pay the debts of another from the statute of frauds upon the
sole ground that the object of the promisor is to subserve an interest of
his own. Indeed the improbability of determining the promisor's object
without resort to some external standard is inherent in the test as stated.
As the test seems to be applied the existence of a promise is assumed for
the moment and inquiry is made into the surrounding circumstances to
determine, if possible, the reasons which would be likely to generate such
a promise. If, in the light of such circumstances, the probability of the
existence of a promise is not too remote, the court considers itself justified
in submitting to the jury the question of whether or not the promise was
ig. Id. at 53.
Ibid.
21. Id. at 51.
22. III Pa. 471, 4 Atl. 15 (1886).
23. But see Klein v. Rand, 35 Pa. Super. 263, 269 (i9o8) wherein the court purports to follow the United States Supreme Court rule of somewhat different emphasis.
Emerson v. Slater, 63 U. S. 28, 43 (1859). See Note (1932) 17 ST. Louis L. REV. 348,
352, 358 et seq.
24. There is considerable conflict between different jurisdictions as to whether contracts of indemnity are, in the first instance, covered by the statute of frauds. The
Nugent case takes the affirmative view in a well-reasoned opinion. See 2 WLLISTON,
op. cit. supra note 5, § 482; ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 37. Pennsylvania adopts the
view, apparently a minority one, that the statute is applicable to such contracts: Nugent
v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 471, 4 At. 15 (1886); Bayard v. Penna. Knitting Mills, 290 Pa. 79,
20.

137 Atl. 91o (1927) ; but cf. Elkin v. Timlin, 15, Pa. 491, 25 Atl. 139 (1892).
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in fact made.23 The presence of what circumstances justifies such procedure is the subject of considerable disagreement, and the uncertainty
caused thereby makes prediction hazardous, although the confusion seems
for the most part to arise from the language used rather than from actual
results reached.
As a general proposition it has been noted that the mere presence of
consideration is insufficient to remove the promise from the statute. A
contrary view would render the statute a nullity, since consideration is necessary to support the promise even in absence of the statute. On the other
hand, when it appears that the original liability is released on the making
of the new promise, the statute is inapplicable since there is no obligation
from a third person in existence.2 Thus the utility of the leading object
rule, however applied, depends upon the continuance of the original liability and upon the presence of something more than the consideration
requisite to a binding contract.2 7 Perhaps one of the more obvious factual
2s
situations to which the rule has been applied is that in Elkin v. Tinlin,
where S and P desired to sell their individual interests in a tract of land,
C agreeing to buy both interests, but not either without the other. When
P's deed was offered to C, he objected to taking it, fearing there might be
judgments against P, but was induced to do so by the oral promise of S
to stand good to him for all judgments against P. C, suffering loss, sued
S on his promise, and recovery was allowed because S benefited in the
disposal of his interest in the land which could not have been accomplished
29
without inducing C to accept P's deed. Likewise in Bailey v. Marshall,
where C, judgment creditor of P, refrained from bidding on P's property
at sheriff's sale on the strength of S's promise to see C's judgment against
P paid, and S, also a judgment creditor of P, was thereby enabled to buy
in the property at his own figure, the court enforced his promise, saying
that his sole purpose was to silence C as an antagonistic bidder and that
he reaped the full fruits thereof. In each of these cases the consideration
for the alleged promise actually operated to S's pecuniary advantage.2 0
On the other hand, in Bayard v. Penna. Knitting Mills, 1 where S,
a new corporation organized to take over the stock of P corporation in
25. But see Paul and Russell v. Levitties, 95 Pa. Super. 92, 94 (1928) where the
court splits the case into two questions: (I) whether the promise was in fact made, and
(2) if made, was it a promise to "answer for the debt or default of another", and therefore not actionable under the statute, or an original undertaking to subserve the defendant's own interests and purposes. That this approach is incorrect has been noted.
See p. 210 supra.
26. Merriman v. McManus, io2 Pa. io2 (1883); see Burr v. Mazer, 2 Pa. Super.
436, 44o (I896) ; but see Shoemaker v. King, 40 Pa. io7, iio (i861) where it is said
that the promise cannot be removed from the statute so long as the old debt remains.
However, the continuance of the original debt is no longer conclusive.
27. There is some tendency to make use of the leading object rule even though it
is apparent that the new agreement was made in discharge of the original debtor, or
that there never was an obligation from a third person: Burr v. Mazer, 2 Pa. Super.
436 (i896) ; Electro-Tint Engraving Co. v. Eckels & Co., 115 Pa. Super. 509, 175 Atl.
876 (934).
28. 151 Pa. 491, 25 Atl. 139 (1892).
29. 174 Pa. 602, 34 Atl. 326 (1896).
3o. Accord: Landis v. Royer, 59 Pa. 95 (1868) ; Pizzi v. Nardello, 209 Pa. I, 57
Atl. ixoo (1904); Weber & Co. v. Bishop, 12 Pa. Super. 5, (i8D9); Baxter v. Hurlburt, i5 Pa. Super. 541 (igoi) ; but cf. O'Hara's Estate, 118 Pa. Super. 558, i8o Atl.
86 (1935). Where the promisor has a real interest in property which he wishes to release from the creditor's grasp, the answer seems clear: HANNA, CASES ON SEcuRTY
(1932) 352. But the indication is that the statute applies where the only advantage
gained was compensation for becoming security. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs (1932)
§ 184.
31. 290 Pa. 79, 137 Atl. 910 (1927).
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reorganization proceedings, promised C that if he guaranteed payment of
debts of P, he would be indemnified from loss by S, the court, in denying recovery on this promise for loss sustained, said that S's interest as
prospective shareholder in promoting the financial success of the company
was not sufficient, not being an individual interest but rather one shared
with all other stockholders.8 2 The failure of the court to inquire into the
benefit actually acquired by S as a result of the transaction suggests that the
character or sufficiency of the interest present is more important. The inference is that if S's interest in the corporation, whether as director, officer,
creditor, or substantial stockholder, is individual and not such as is shared
by every other stockholder or creditor, the promise will be enforced.'3
This principle seems to be further born out in Kirby v. Kirby,34 although
an opposite result was reached. S, widow of P who had died indebted
to C, promised C she would pay the debt if C did not sue the estate.
Recovery was allowed on the promise in spite of evidence that the estate
was very small, the court saying that S had an interest of her own in the
transaction and her promise was therefore to subserve a purpose of her
own, namely, keeping whatever estate P left. It did not appear whether
the estate would have been sufficient to pay the debt, but the court treated
this as of no importance.3" Thus it appears that the denial of the protection of the statute is not made to depend on the showing of a profit resulting from the transaction. The question in the background of both the
Bayard case and the Kirby case seems to be whether S's personal interest
is of such a nature that it points unequivocally to him as the promisor.
This question could have been answered affirmatively in either the Elkin
case or the Bailey case, but any emphasis on the advantage actually gained
by S, as expressed in these cases, would seem to dictate opposite results
in both the Bayard case and the Kirby case. This necessitates the conclusion that the nature or sufficiency of the interest rather than the benefit
actually received is of more importance, since it is only on the former
ground that the cases can be reconciled.'
(b) Necessity of an Original Undertaking
There has been, however, surprising consistency in requiring that the
leading object rule be applied in such a way as to show an original rather
than a collateral obligation on the part of the promisor, an obligation to
pay his own debt even though payment results in extinguishing the debt
of another, before the promise can be removed from the statute. 37 Thus
in Lewis v. Lewis Lumber Mfg. Co., 38 S, lumber company, contracted
with P, jobber, to peel and pile bark. P employed C to work on the job,
32. Accord: Sharp v. Levan, 236 Pa. 374, 84 Atl. 915 (1912) ; but cf. Goodling v.
Simon, 54 Pa. Super. 125 (1913). On the general situation elsewhere cf. Harburg
India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin, [1902] I K. B. 778; Hurst Hardware Co. v. Goodman, 68 W. Va. 462, 69 S. E. 898 (191o).
33. Goodling v. Simon, 54 Pa. Super. 125 (1913).
34. 248 Pa. 117, 93 Atl. 874 (1915).
35. Id. at 119, 93 Atl. at 874. The payment of interest on the debt by S for eight
years must have been treated as an added factor pointing to S's liability, although the
court did not expressly so treat it. This would seem a good case for application of the
analogy suggested supra note 4.
36. The interest must be of a pecuniary or business nature rather than of the sort
arising out of family relationship or love and affection. Kaestner v. Robling, 6 Lack.
Jur. 366 (Pa. 19o5).
37. Bailey v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 602, 34 Atl. 326 (1896); Kelly v. Baun, 6 Pa.
Super. 327 (1898) ; cf. Stouffer v. Jackson, 42 Pa. Super. 450 (1910). See ARNOLD, op.
cit. supra note 2, § 64. But the distinction between an original and a collateral under-.
taking seems specious and impossible of uniform application in the cases.
38. 156 Pa. 217, 27 Atl. 2o (1893).
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and after some time C began to fear he would not get paid by P if he continued to work for him. S persuaded him to continue by promising to see
him paid. The court denied recovery on this promise on the ground that
it was purely a collateral undertaking to pay after P's default and hence
squarely within the statute. 9 And in Corcoran v. Huey,0 on substantially similar facts, where S's promise was in the terms: "we will see to
it that you are paid", the court, adopting without discussion the view that
an original undertaking must be made out, said it was proper for the jury
to determine under all the circumstances whether the undertaking of S
was original or collateral, the form of the promise in itself not being inconsistent with an original obligation, nor being conclusive of either type of
obligation. 4'
This requirement seems to have arisen out of a desire to
satisfy the wording of the statute and to avoid the criticism that removal
of such promises from the operation of the statute is judicial legislation.
That the position thereby taken is inaccurate is apparent from a reference
to the nature of promises to pay the debts of another to be incurred in the
future.
It is clear that the promise to pay for goods or other consideration
inuring to the benefit of a third person, without more, is not such a promise
as is contemplated by the statute since there was never any liability imposed
upon or credit extended to the third person, the promise being only to
pay the promisor's own debtY When it becomes difficult to determine to
whom credit was extended, the form of the promise as well as the surrounding circumstances are taken into consideration, the question being
primarily one of fact for the jury. But when it appears that the credit
of the third person as well as that of the promisor was some inducement
to the advancement of the consideration, and the third person receives the
benefit thereof, the third person becomes the principal debtor and the promisor is merely a surety, regardless of the arrangement inter sese.4 3 The
4
dogma is that one quid pro quo cannot give rise to two original debts, "
and since the receiver of the benefit becomes the debtor, the promisor is
necessarily within the protection of the statute as one whose liability is
secondary or collateral to that of the principal debtor, unless the obligation
was a joint one. 45 Whether or not this view be taken as accurate for all
purposes, brief reflection will show the desirability for its acceptance so
far as the statute of frauds is concerned. For if the applicability of the
statute is made to depend on whether or not the promise of S was in the
same terms as that of P and not conditioned on P's default, the only effect
of the statute would be to cause C, having failed to recover from P, to
allege an absolute rather than a conditional promise which is perhaps just
as susceptible of proof contrary to fact, and there is, again, nothing else
indicative of liability in S.4 6 Thus it would seem that removal of such a'
promise from the statute under the leading object rule should not be made
to depend on whether a primary or original obligation on the part of the
39. Accord: Rancil v. Krohne, 31 Pa. Super. 13o (i9o6).
40. 231 Pa. 441, 8o Ati. 881 (1911).
41. Accord: Gable v. Graybill, I Pa. Super. 29 (895); 2
note 5, § 465.
42. See note 6 supra.
43. See

BROWNE, STATUTE OF

FRAUDS (5th ed.

I895)

§

WILLISTON,

197;

op. cit. supra

2 WILLsToN, op. cit.

supra note 5, § 466.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. But see ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, § 35.
46. "If joint and several liability may be orally created, it seems difficult to see
why several liability may not be." 2 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1346. See
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 181.
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promisor can be made out.4 7

Indeed in Kampmnan v. Pittsburgh Con-

tracting & Engineering Co.,4" the most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the subject, the court, although continuing to pay lip
service to the requirement of an original undertaking,49 reached a result
opposite to that in the Lewis case on facts hardly distinguishable therefrom.
C, materialman, had been supplying materials to P, subcontractor, and,
becoming doubtful of P's ability to pay either for the materials already
supplied or for those ordered, threatened to stop furnishing them. S, general contractor, persuaded him to continue by promising to see him paid,
and C, in supplying further goods, continued to bill P therefor. In allowing recovery, the court at first professed to decide that S's undertaking was
primary, but on being confronted with the argument that C continued to
bill P,o was inclined to approve the position taken by the Restatement of
Contracts which clearly allows recovery on the oral promise, although conditioned on P's failure to perform.5
As a fundamental proposition, it would seem that the requirement of
an original undertaking, rather than being a part of the leading object
rule, is quite distinct therefrom, and a prerequisite to removal of a promise
from the statute additional to sufficiency of interest. For, as illustrated in
the construction cases, where the promisors' interests are always of a similar nature, the conflicting results reached can be explained only on the
ground that an original obligation was or was not made out.
III. CONCLUSION

That the "main purpose" or the "leading object" of the promisor does
not control the operation of the statute seems apparent. In the first place
necessity for resort to the surrounding circumstances in determining a
state of mind is obvious and suggests that one or some of these factors
aiding in the determination is of more significance than an ultimate conclusion as to purpose or object. In the second place the results of the
cases cannot be reconciled by the application of such a test. Where a
stockholder of a corporation promises to pay a debt owed by it, his purpose to promote his own financial interests is scarcely to be denied, yet
it has been seen that this is not controlling."2 Again, in the typical construction contract where the general contractor promises to pay the materialman both for materials already supplied and those to be supplied to
the subcontractor, emphasis on his purpose in making the promise may
well lead to enforcement of the promise to pay for future supplies but not
for supplies furnished prior to the making of the promise.5 3 But such a
distinction has not been made in the cases. 54 Further, the express conditioning of the promise on the failure of the principal to pay is strong
evidence that the promisor's purpose was to answer for the default of an47. The foregoing discussion is directed toward situations in which the extension

of credit to the principal occurred subsequent to the time of S's promise, for it is recognized that an obligation incurred subsequent to the extension of the credit can be original or primary, although the old debt continues and is incidentally discharged by the
satisfaction of such obligation. However, this discussion is persuasive for the rejection
of the requirement in the latter case as well for the sake of consistency.
48. 316 Pa. 5o2, 175 Atl. 396 (934).
49. Id. at 504.
50. Id. at 5o6.
51. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrS (1932) § 184, illustration I. This appears to be a
minority rule, however: Note (1935) 99 A. L. R. 96.
52. See p. 214 supra.

53. See ARANT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 123.
54. Pizzi v. Nardello, 209 Pa. I, 57 Atl. IOO (1904); Kampman v. Pittsburgh

Contracting Co., 3z6 Pa. 5o2, 175 Atl. 396 (1934).

NOTE

other. But that the form of the promise is of no greater importance than
the other surrounding circumstances has been observed.
While the actual receipt of a benefit by the promisor has generally
been applied as the test," it seems that the courts are limiting the scope
of the statute to even a greater degree in enforcing promises regardless
of the advantage gained5 ' and in spite of the fact that the consideration is
not inherently beneficial to the promisor, where the surrounding circumstances and application of the foresight rule show that the alleged promisor occupies a position wherein he is peculiarly susceptible to the acquisition of an advantage as a result of the creditor's course of conduct. The
nature of the whole subject does not permit of a more accurate definition,
and although the courts are apparently concerned with the presence of an
individual pecuniary interest in the promisor, results are bound to vary
with the personnel of the courts. The objective in all the cases is to discover something of substance aside from the promise itself which makes
it likely that a promise was actually made, and while the actual receipt of
a benefit by the promisor strengthens such an inference, the courts do not
always look on this factor as an essential or as the ultimate test.
Finally, to apply the statute to a situation wherein the undertaking
is found to be collateral, although a sufficient pecuniary interest in the
promisor is obviously present and being served, is to attach an arbitrary and technical impediment to what originated as a rule for the more
equitable application of the statute. The more desirable view, tendency
toward which is manifested in the Kampnmn case, considering the presence of an original undertaking as not essential, does not increase the
likelihood of the evils contemplated by the statute, and more general adoption of such view would do much to eliminate confusion and establish
a reasonable uniformity in applying the so-called "leading object" rule.
The only justification for the other view was to avoid the criticism of
judicial legislation, the existence of which, so far as the statute of frauds
is concerned, is widespread throughout the country.
S.W.F.
55. See note 30 supra.
56. See p. 2io supra.

